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ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS
To what extent do courts recognize as conclusive the determina-
tions by tribunals established by law in connection with the executive
department of government?
According to the philosophy of government prevailing at the
time our Federal Constitution was adopted the prime object of law
was to protect society against criminals and to secure for each citizen
the greatest possible measure of individual liberty. While section
eight of Article One of the Constitution gave Congress broad
powers covering such subjects as taxation, borrowing money, regulat-
ing commerce, coining money, adopting rules of naturalization, estab-
lishing postoffices and post roads, establishing courts, declaring war
and raising armies, providing for a navy, and finally the comprehensive
power to provide for the general welfare, Congress at first contented
itself with providing the agencies necessary to carry out what there-
tofore were clearly recognized as govenmental functions It made
provision for the army and navy, made regulations with respect to
foreign commerce, established courts inferior to the Supreme Court,
provided for postoffices and postal routes, and for a currency.
At this time the colonies covered but a small area and the col-
onists were engaged principally in agriculture. But in the course of
time a large public domain was acquired, industry became diversified,
manufactures grew, commerce assumed vast proportions, the question
of transportation demanded attention, immigration increased rapidly,
and it became necessary to adopt measures and provide agencies for
the regulation of these matters. So it came about that Congress, by
appropriate legislation, created boards and commissions to put these
measures into operation, giving them authority to adopt rules for
facilitating the work committed to them. While the functions of
these bodies were largely ministerial and administrative, their exercise
frequently involved the decision of questions of law and the determina-
tion of questions of fact-duties judicial in character. It was quite
natural that the right of such bodies to exercise functions so nearly
akin to those recognized as judicial should be challenged, for the
Federal Constitution emphasized the division of governmental func-
tions into executive, legislative and judicial, and conveyed the thought
that neither of these departments should encroach upon the others.
And again the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the Consti-
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tution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without "due process of law" furnished the basis for the argument
that the decisions of some of these administrative tribunals at any
rate, were invalid because they deprived a citizen of his liberty or
property without due process of law.
As preliminary to a discussion of the question of the conclusive-
ness of the determination of administrative tribunals, let us first
inquire how, under our fundamental theory of the separation of the
powers of government, the agent of the executive department can in
any case assume to act judicially.
The courts have held that such duties may be delegated to these
tribunals and have placed their ruling upon the broad ground of
necessity and convenience. Evidently much of their work was routine
in character, some of a highly technical nature, so that taken all
together it could be done much more efficiently, economically and
promptly by administrative officers than by the courts. True, the
management and control of these matters by the executive department
does inv olve the determination of private property rights, but the
right of the individual must yield to public necessity, and the action
of Congress in establishing the various administrative boards and
commission has been sustained by the courts.
Before considering the matter of how far the court will recognize
as conclusive the determination of these tribunals the question of their
right to consider a particular controversy, in a word, their jurisdiction
may be briefly discussed. There are three conditions upon which a
valid exercise of jurisdiction by these bodies depends.
First, the Constitution provides in the Fifth Amendment, that
no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law; therefore the procedure of these agencies irust be of
a character to satisfy this constitutional guaranty.
Second, since the authority of these bodies depends upon statutes,
it must appear that their action in any proceeding is within the scope
and power conferred by the statute; in other words, the statute must
confer jurisdiction over the matter to be determined.
Third, the attempted exercise of jurisdiction by the tribunal in
question must not have been brought about by a fraud practiced
upon ;t.
Now let us take these up in their order.
First, as to due process of law. If an administrative board acting
within the statutory jurisdiction makes a decision adverse to the prop-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol3/iss3/4
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
erty right of a citizen, can that citizen complain that he has been
denied due process of law, and demand a trial in the courts? The
answer depends upon the meaning of the phrase, "due process of law."
The Supreme Court is the proper body to determine this question
and it has repeatedly held that the clause does not require the process
of a court of law. Any method of procedure which conforms to the
fundamental principles of natural justice and protects the individual
from arbitrary and oppressive action is due process of law. This
proposition is stated in Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,
18 Howard 272, as follows: "The article is a restraint on the legis-
lative as well as on the executive and judicial powers of the Govern-
ment, and cannot be so construed as to leave Congress free to make
any process 'due process of law,' by its mere will. To what principles
then are we to resort to ascertain what process enacted by Congress
is due process? * * * We must examine the Constitution itself
to see whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions.
If not found to be so, we must look to those settled usages and modes
of proceeding existing in England before the emigration of our
ancestors."
So in the case of Springer v. U. S., 102 U. S. 586, it was held
that in order to enforce the payment of taxes, Congress may cause
property to be distrained and sold, and that the owner of such property
is not thereby deprived of it without due process of law. In this case
the Court says: "The prompt payment of taxes is always important
to the public welfare. It may be vital to the existence of a govern-
ment. The idea that every taxpayer is entitled to the delays of litiga-
tion is unreason."
However, the limitation on such power was expressed in a general
way in Chin Low v. U. S., 208 U. S. 8, where it was held that the
Leg;slature cannot vest in any official, a purely personal, arbitrary
power, and that to do so is a denial of due process of law.
On these interpretations, then, the proceedings of administrative
commissions in general have been held to constitute due process of
law, and in most cases the statutes under which they derive their
authority have been held to be constitutional.
The statute creating a commission or board, or vesting such
powers as we have been considering in an officer, having been found
to make due provision for such a hearing as will satisfy the require-
ment of due process of law, we come to the second limitation upon
the power of these administrative tribunals, found in the fact that
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their iurisdiction is necessarily limited by the terms of the enabling
statute under which they act.
The exercise of judicial power by administrative officers must,
in practically every instance, be authorized by some legislative act so
that we cannot view the general working of this law without consider-
ing in each instance the effect of the particular statute involved.
When acting within its statutory jurisdiction the action of an
administrative body is binding, but its determination that it has juris-
diction may be attacked directly in a court of law and is always subject
to review.
The Legislature may make the powers of these bodies broad or
narrow, but a person whose property rights are affected has a right
to insist that the tribunal keep within its statutory jurisdiction. Its
action in his case must be within the scope of the authority conferred,
and he has a right to have the question determined by a court of law.
The courts, as a rule, while announcing that these statutes shall
receive a reasonable construction, are not inclined to extend the powers
conferred by implication, and this is especially true in taxation and
revenue cases.
A good example of these cases is McClean v. Jephson, 123 N. Y.
142, where in holding a tax assessment invalid, the court says: "There
is no prerogative of a government which is more liable to abuse than
that which authorizes it to seize and appropriate the property of the
citizen for public purposes, and none which is regarded with more
jealous scrutiny by the courts. The authority of its officers to exer-
cise the power of taxation has uniformly been carefully scrutinized
and limited to the express warrant of the statute and cannot be
extended by implication or construction."
Moreover these tribunals may not themselves interpret the statute
so as to confer jurisdiction upon themselves, where, in fact, no such
jurisdiction was intended, and conclude the parties in interest by such
determination. As was said in the case of Dorn v. Backer, 61 N. Y.
261: "it may be said now to be settled, that assessors cannot acquire
jurisdiction by deciding that they have it. Before assessing the plain-
tiff for taxation in the town of Ava, it was essential that he should
be a resident of that town, and, if not, they had no jurisdiction."
The case of McClean v. Jephson, cited above, states the propo-
sition so well as to justify an extended quotation: "Some of the
duties of the assessors are judicial in their nature, and as to them,
while acting within the scope of their authority, they are protected
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from attack collaterally to the same extent as other judicial officers;
but they are subordinate officers, possessing no authority, except such
as is conferred upon them by statute, and it is a well settled and
salutary rule that such officer must see that they act within the
authority committed to them. * * * So when their right to act
depends on the existence of some fact which they erroneously deter-
mine to exist their acts are void."
The third limitation upon administrative action which I have
mentioned is fraud, in which is included imposition and mistake. A
review on this ground is not peculiar to this class of cases, but applies
generally to all branches of the law. As a matter of course any judi-
cial decision is reviewable if the court has been the victim of a fraud
by one of the parties. I mention fraud merely to clear the field of
all collateral matter before taking up the precise question suggested
by the title of this paper.
To recapitulate, then, there are three grounds upon which the
action of an administrative body may be held for naught, because the
basis of its action was lacking in some fundamental requisite.
In order to reduce the proposition to its lowest and simplest
terms, and avoid all confusion, I have eliminated the three considera-
tions just discussed, and shall now consider the question on the
assumption that the administrative body has jurisdiction, that it acts
according to due process of law, and that it did not assume jurisdiction
because of some fraud perpetrated upon it and that its decision is not
tainted with fraud.
If then we have a case which has been decided by an administra-
tive tribunal, and is not open to attack on any one of the above
grounds, is the decision conclusive and final? The answer (which
must, in view of the numerous types of statutes and commissions,
necessarily be general) is that the decision is final as to the findings
of fact but not as to the holdings of law. The courts are practically
a unit in holding the determinations of these various tribunals con-
clusive as to facts. The most obvious and practical reason for this is
that to hold otherwise would be to defeat the very purpose of creating
such boards by permitting every case to be appealed. It will be neces-
sary to review only a few of the numerous cases which support this
proposition.
Of the land office cases, O'Connor v. Gertgens. 85 Minn. 481, is
illustrative. It was there ruled that the proposition is well settled
that the authority to hear and determine all questions of fact in the
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land department is exclusively within the control of the officers of
that department. The court goes on to say that the jurisdicion thus
conferred by statute is judicial in its nature, and the decisions of the
department officers when acting within their jurisdiction are final and
c,nclusive in the absence of fraud, imposition, or mistake.
The case of Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, announces
the ,ame rule with relation to the postal department. The postmaster
there had excluded from the mail as second-class matter a periodical
publication known as "Masters in Music." Each number of the publi-
cation was devoted exclusively to the portrait, biography and works
of some famous musician, and the postmaster based his refusal to
allow it as second-class matter on the ground that each number was a
complete volume in itself. The Supreme Court in holding this to be
principally a question of fact on which the decision of the postmaster
was conclusive, cites the land office decision and states that it is a
long settled practice of the court to treat the decisions of the land
department upon a question of fact as conclusive, although such
proceedings to a certain extent involve the exercise of judicial powers.
The same rule was applied to the decisions of the commission of
immigration as appears from examination of the cases involving the
exclusion of Chinese and Japanese immigrants. See case of Rkiu
v. U. S , 142 U. S. 651. In that case a female subject of the Emperor
of Japan was excluded under a statute commanding the exclusion of
".i person liable to become a public charge." On appeal the petitioner
wished to introduce evidence as to her condition, but this was excluded.
To quote from the opinion of the court: "But on the other hand, the
final determination of those facts may be entrusted by Congress to
executive officers, and in such case, as in all others in which a statute
gives discretionary power to an officer to be exercised by him upon
his own opinion of certain facts, he is made the sole and exclusive
judge of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless
expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to re-examine or
controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted."
On the other hand, however, the courts are almost as unanimous
in holding that administrative determinations are not conclusive as to
questions of law. The courts are loath to relinquish any of their
jurisdiction over legal questions, and do not accept the decisions of
other tribunals; maintaining that where such a question is involved
everyone has a right to an adjudication by a regularly constituted court
of law. A most instructive case on this phase of the question is
The American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U. S.
94, which arose on appeal from the decision of the postmaster, that
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the correspondence of the school should be excluded from the mail
as being a fraud on the public, because the school taught healing by
psychology. In discussing the question the court concedes that the
decision of the postmaster on matters of fact is conclusive. However,
it is a different matter, says the court, when the evidence before the
postmaster in any view of the facts fails to show that there was a
violation of any law. In such a case if the postmaster decided that
there was a violation of law this would be a pure mistake of law on
his part, because the facts being conceded, whether they amounted to
a violation of the statute would be a legal question and not a question
of fact. On this reasoning the court held that the decision of the
postmaster involved a mistake of law and was, therefore, reviewable.
The land office decisions are more favorable to the power of
adninistrative bodies, due to a liberal statute, yet James v. Iron Co.,
107 Federal 596, a land case, is quite similar to the McAnnulty case.
After affirming the authority of the land department to hear and
determine claims to public lands subject to its disposition, the court
affirms that the decision is not impregnable to direct attack as to
errors of law. The legal title derived from the action of the depart-
ment may be charged with a trust for the benefit of the party lawfully
entitled to the land either on the ground (1) that upon the facts found
its officers fell into a clear error in the construction of the law, or for
the reason (2) that, thfough fraud or gross mistake, they fell into a
misapprehension of the facts before them.
There are, however, some few scattered cases which apparently
hold that the decisions of administrative tribunals are conclusive as
to law as well as to fact. Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497, is one
of the earliest decisions to this effect, and U. S. v. Hitchcock, 190
U. S. 316, is another often cited. In the latter case, it was sought
by mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Interior to vacate an order
rejecting a selection of public land. The Court held, however, that
neither mandamus nor injunction would lie against an officer of the
land department to control him in discharging an official duty which
requires the exercise of his judgment and discretion, and this notwith-
standing the fact that the Court also held that the decision of the Sec-
retary was not subject to review on writ of error. Again the case
of In re Ota, 96 Fed. 487, strongly maintains this view. Here the
exclusion of an alien was involved, the Commissioner of Immigration
having acted under the very liberal and comprehensive statute of 1903,
which provides that the decision of immigration officers, if adverse to
the alien, shall be final. Under this statute it was held that when the
ececutive officers of the government on a hearing such as is contem-
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plated by the law have decided that an alien is not entitled to enter the
(Tited States the Courts are without jurisdiction to review that deter-
mination upon questions either of law or of fact.
'There is a line of cases which hold that where a department has
uniformly for a long period of time adopted a certain construction
of a statute that the Courts will accept such construction as correct
and binding. However, the Courts usually go no further than to hold
that such construction is entitled to great weight and should be adopted
unless it is clearly erroneous. To this effect are the cases of U. S.
v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 59, U. S. v. Healey, 160 U. S. 145, and Mc-
Fadden v. Mining Co., 97 Fed. 670.
True, in the case of Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne (supra) the
Court disregarded a practice of the post office department which had
been observed for sixteen years, but there was a strong dissent by the
Chief Justice and by Mr. Justice Harlan in which the Chief Justice
expressed his views as follows: "We had supposed it to be firmly
settled that the established practice of an executive department charged
with the execution of a statute will be respected and followed, espe-
cially if it has been long continued, unless such practice rests upon a
construction of a statute which is clearly and obviously wrong."
Now while there are cases which hold that the determination of
these administrative boards are conclusive as to the law, the great
weight of authority seems to support the contrary view, while all the
cases seem to agree that the findings of fact are conclusive.
But there is a class of cases fitting in between the two classes just
discussed. In these cases (and they are very numerous) the question
nvolved is one of mixed law and fact. This point has been raised in
three cases famous in the field of administrative law, and in each the
decision has been to the effect that where the question is one of mixed
law and fact the decision is not reviewable. Mr. Justice Miller states
the proposition concisely in Marquez v. Frisbie, 101 U. S. 473, as fol-
lows: "This means, and it is a sound principle, that where there is a
mixed question of law and fact, and the Court cannot so separate it
as to see clearly where the mistake of law is, the decision of the
tribunal to which the law has confided the matter is conclusive."
This point was also one of the main questions in Bates & Guild
Co. v. Payne (cited above), in which the Court refused to go the
full length of the proposition stated by Mr. Justice Miller, but inti-
mated that the Court might on occasion review questions of mixed law
and fact. The rule was summarized to be "that where the decision of
a question of fact is committed by Congress to the judgment and dis-
cretion of a head of a department, his decision thereon is conclusive;
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and that even upon mixed questions of law and fact, or of law alone,
his action will carry with it a strong presumption of its correctness,
and the Court will not ordinarily review it, although they may have
the power and will occasionally exercise the right of so doing."
The case of Coal Co. v. Evans, 80 red. 425, was in effect in accord
with Marquez v. Frisbie, for it was there held that in a bill attacking
a decision of the land department on the ground that its officers mis-
construed the law, the evidence and findings must be set out in such
a manner that the Court can separate the findings of fact from the
conclusion of law, and unless sufficient facts are shown to make it
plain that an error of law was committed such a bill cannot be sus-
tained.
To summarize, then, an examination of the cases tends to show
that the law upon this question is as follows:
I. That decisions of administrative tribunals are always review-
able where (a) the requirements of due process of law have not been
observed, (b) where the tribunal acted outside of the scope of its
jurisdiction, and (c) where the decision is tainted with fraud.
II. That, absent the above objections the decisions of administra-
tive tribunals are (a) universally held conclusive as to its findings of
fact, (b) that where the question is one of mixed law and fact they
are conclusive unless the rulings upon the law and findings of fact
can be separated and it can be shown that the error is one of law, and
(c) that these determinations are reviewable in all cases where there
has been an erroneous application of the law.
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